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Abstract 
The working paper examines the complexity of Tunisian Salafism and its role in the 
process of transition to democracy the country is experiencing. Building on primary 
sources and original field work, the article highlights the theoretical and practical 
divergences that affect the Salafist camp in Tunisia in the context of its struggle to 
represent a class of disenfranchised youth unwilling to support a process of renewal 
of political institutions that they perceive as contributing their marginalization. In 
addition, the article explores the ways in which, paradoxically, the emergence and 
public presence of Salafism can contribute to the strengthening of democratic debate 
in the country.    
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 1 
 Introduction 
 The English-speaking academic literature on Arab politics and society of the last 
three decades tended to neglect the case of Tunisia. Despite some notable exceptions, 
including John Entelis, Stephen King, Eva Bellin, Laryssa Chomiak, Christopher 
Alexander, Emma Murphy, and Melani Cammett, Tunisia never featured prominently 
either as a single case study or in comparative works. The fall of the Ben Ali regime 
seemed to change that and both the policy-making community and academia focused 
extensively on Tunisia in order to understand and explain the causes of the Arab Spring, 
gauge the possibility of a transition to democracy in an Arab country, highlight the 
challenges facing Tunisia and by extension the whole region and examine the 
implications of regime change on regional politics and international security. However, 
and true to form, the attention on Tunisia faded quite quickly, particularly after the 
successful October 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly, as more ‘relevant’ 
countries became embroiled in the ‘Spring’ with Egypt and Syria in particular taking 
centre stage.  
 For the majority of scholars and analysts still following Tunisia, the institutional 
changes and the daily political developments characterizing the transition have become 
the exclusive focus. We thus have analyses of the ‘success’ of the Tunisian transition1 
together with more sober ones highlighting the problems the country faces as it builds a 
liberal-democratic system.2 All this is certainly important and to a certain extent justified 
by the fact that the first phase of the transition, roughly from January 2011 until October 
of the same year, saw the rapid institutionalization and the return to open activism of the 
traditional political families of the country: the liberal left incarnated by Moncef 
Marzouki, Najib Chebbi and Mohammad Ben Jaafar, the Islamists led by Rachid 
Ghannouchi and the extreme left with the communists at the forefront. In addition, 
there has been the re-appropriation of autonomy on the part of the historic trade union, 
the UGTT. The elections of October 2011 saw the victory of the Islamist Ennahda, 
which formed a government coalition with the liberal left in order to guarantee a smooth 
transition to democracy by overseeing the drafting of a new Constitution. Since then, 
most analyses have focused on how the government performed, on the internal 
problems the coalition has, on its supposed incompetence, on Ennahda’s perceived 
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‘double-speak’ when it comes to its commitment to democracy and secularism and on 
the return on the scene of those politicians who are still inspired by Bourguibism 
together with the usual debate on women’s rights.3 This almost exclusive focus on 
institutional politics and on how the new political system deals with the social and 
economic challenges produces however an analytical vacuum with respect to what is 
occurring in wider society. This shortcoming reproduces to a large extent the analytical 
mistakes that were made before the Arab Spring occurred when the attention on the 
state and on high politics generally clouded the way in which society was reacting to the 
upgrading of authoritarian rule.4 In the Tunisian case, important aspects of the transition 
have only been marginally examined, preventing therefore a clearer understanding of the 
emergence of phenomena that are labeled ‘surprising’ when in fact they might not 
actually be so. For instance, very little has been made of the low turnout for the October 
2011 elections when over 45 per cent of citizens could not be bothered turning out for 
what were considered ‘historic’ elections. Such low turnout should lead to ask questions 
about the political and social attitudes of those who did not vote and about the type of 
socio-political movements that they might feel represented by. It should also lead to 
questions about the way in which they might engage socially, if at all, and what the 
consequences for the transition this might have. The advanced age of the leadership 
across the political spectrum is a second element that should lead to questions about the 
role of the younger generation, the one that was at the forefront of the Jasmine 
Revolution. Where has the youth gone? What kind of social and political activism, if any, 
draws young Tunisians today in the midst of a process of reconstruction of society and 
its institutions? A final important element is the middle-class nature of the current 
process of political democratic institutionalization whereby the poorer strata of the 
population are barely involved in the construction of the new state. Those who are 
economically marginalized and more generally disenfranchised do not feature much and 
their demands are dismissed in the name of economic realism with such dismissal 
coming from the vast majority of political actors, including Ennahda. If one adds that the 
new Tunisia is unlikely to challenge what many citizens would see as problematic links 
with Western countries, notably France and the United States, what we have is a distinct 
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class element that is not taken into account. However these socio-economic and political 
instances have to eventually find a home, particularly because there is a high degree of 
pluralism today in the country which permits all sorts of political and social movements 
to organize and be active. With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the emergence of 
Salafism came as a shock to many Tunisians and to the international community and that 
a significant degree of political and mediatic alarmism has characterized the few analyses 
of the phenomenon.5 Such analyses are usually linked to the threat that Salafism poses to 
the consolidation of the democratic process, but very little is actually known about the 
way in which the Salafist ideology is differently interpreted and used in the areas of the 
country where it is taking hold. Through an examination of the less discussed aspects of 
the Tunisian transition, this article attempts to account for the emergence of Salafism, 
providing a picture of the differences that exist within it and highlighting new social and 
political practices that characterize it.  
 
The rise of Salafism  
 One of the most interesting and surprising outcomes of the Arab Spring has 
been the forceful public emergence of Salafist movements across the region. In its 
modern meaning Salafism refers to “conservative Sunni Muslims who seek to apply 
literalist interpretations of scripture based on the example set by the Prophet and his 
companions.”6 Salafist movements have been traditionally divided into two broad 
categories: scientific Salafists engaged in the promotion of individual behavioral change 
through dawa and jihadi Salafists engaged in violence to bring about an Islamic state 
where sharia would be imposed. Such categorization remains only partially valid today as 
Salafist movements across the region are displaying quite different modes of activism. In 
Egypt, the vast majority of Salafists groups decided early on that they would take 
advantage of the electoral process to form a political coalition that did extremely well in 
the legislative elections.7 In Mali, Salafist groups benefited from the retreat of the central 
government in the northern regions of the country to strike an alliance with local 
separatist groups and create some sort of emirate governed through the imposition of 
strict sharia law. In Syria, Salafist armed groups are very active in the civil war against the 
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government and are attracting an increasing number of foreign fighters.8 In Morocco, the 
vast majority of Salafists are still committed to political and social change through dawa 
and educational activities, although some of them are attempting to set up a political 
party.9 All this indicates that Salafism as a whole is a very complex phenomenon where 
different interpretations of the sacred texts give rise to different methods of political and 
social engagement. In addition, the specific characteristics of very diverse national 
contexts create further opportunities and constraints for Salafist movements.   
 The case of Tunisia is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First of all, 
Salafism never seemed to have a presence in the country with a significant number of 
Tunisians contending still today that its emergence following the revolution is due to 
outside influences. As demonstrated elsewhere, this is not really the case and although 
important Salafist figures in Tunisia have ‘cut their teeth’ abroad, the movement as a 
whole finds its roots in the rise of Islamism of the late 1980s and the protagonists of 
today are a young generation of disenfranchised youth product of the later years of the 
Ben Ali dictatorship.10 Second, Salafist groups in Tunisia have the opportunity to operate 
in a very free, liberalized and plural political and social environment which, for the 
moment, does not really have any equal across the region. Third, these groups have to 
contend with the fact that an Islamist party is in power. This means that while they are, 
to a degree, in conflict and competition with it, at the same time they have to recognize 
that they are not dealing with what they could label easily an ‘impious’ regime.11 These 
specificities make the Tunisian case an exceptional one and can provide interesting and 
useful insights as to how Salafism operates and evolves.  
 While there is a tendency, particularly in the media, to treat the phenomenon of 
the rise of Salafism as a coherent and cohesive program of conservative revolutionary 
change usually associated with acts of violence and prevarication, this study demonstrates 
the heterogeneity of Tunisian Salafism and sheds some light on its inner workings and 
complexity in a situation of almost permanent flux.  
 The first political actor that deserves to be analyzed in the context of Salafism is 
Jebah al-Islah (Reform Front), often referred to as the first Salafist political party to be 
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legalized in Tunisia after the revolution. The creation of the party and its choice of 
participation in the current institutions of the state mark it out as exceptional because of 
the implicit acceptance of the democratic rules of the game. Its recent legalization in 
March 2012 seems to indicate that there is a Salafist constituency interested in breaking 
with what can be called ‘street politics’ in order to institutionalize its political demands no 
matter how unappealing and radically conservative they might appear to the rest of 
society. As the party also makes clear, their primary objective is to ‘catch’ the Salafist 
support that is clearly present in wider society and turn it into electoral and political 
capital to be used to attain the most significant political goal the party has: the application 
of sharia law in Tunisia. As the party leader Mohammed Khouja told the authors in an 
interview held on October 24, 2012 at the party’s headquarters in Tunis ‘our ambition is 
to unify the Salafist front.’ Another leading member of the bureau executive of Jebah al-
Islah, Rafik Aouni interviewed by the authors on October 22, 2012 in Tunis, spoke for 
instance of the contacts and exchanges they have with the Egyptian Nour regarding their 
political experience as political parties involved in the institutions of the state. In reality, 
this perceived institutionalization of Salafism is nothing novel for the members and 
leaders of this party in so far as it represents the continuation of what they had already 
done in the 1980s when they broke from the Mouvement Tendence Islamique (MTI) – 
Ennahda’s precursor – to form the Tunisian Islamic Front. Thus, in many ways, the 
dilemma of whether Salafists should create a political party although this might be in 
contradiction with the ideological tenets of orthodox Salafism had been solved three 
decades ago for this older generation of Salafists because the theoretical and ideological 
debate over direct participation in politics through a party did not really exist at the time. 
As Mohammed Khouja argued ‘at the time [1970s and 1980s], the choice between dawa 
or politics was not much part of the theoretical debate on how Muslims should be 
involved in the betterment of their society in the sense that it was for us obviously a 
matter of doing both although we had differences regarding the degree to which the 
group should privilege one or the other.’ Thus, in the case of Jebah al-Islah, we can talk 
about re-institutionalization because forming a party and taking part was for this 
generation not particularly controversial. This is further demonstrated when one looks at 
the relationship of the Jebah al-Islah with Ennahda. The major divergence between the 
two parties does not centre on the choice of doing politics and not even on the pluralism 
that the political system should display, but has to do with the vision of society that the 
two movements have. Contrary to Ennahda, Jebah al-Islah is thoroughly committed to the 
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application of sharia law as a foundational source of legislation with fundamentalist and 
orthodox canons. It is very difficult to gauge exactly the popular support of Jebah al-Islah 
in a country in transition and where there is a considerable degree of volatility, but 
according to a poll published in September 2012 the party does not figures as having any 
real electoral support. This is due to the fact that Jebah al-Islah seems to be a party for 
Salafists of a much older generation when in fact the very connotation of Salafist had a 
different meaning from the current one. According to the Jebah al-Islah, the party has the 
important support of leading Salafist sheikhs such as Kamel Marzouki, Bachir Ben 
Hassen, Hassin Shaouat and Hatem Bou Soma,12 although these figures prefer to remain 
involved in education activities and more broadly in civil society activism rather than 
becoming political public figures and openly endorse the party. Irrespective of the 
genuine degree of support that such sheikhs might give the party, it is important to note 
that they do have however a common objective: the moderation of the young Salafist 
radicals imbued with jihadism – not necessarily defined as armed struggle rather as 
internal striving - in order to de-radicalize society and, at the same time, indicate a 
political outlet in institutional politics. 
 It is in fact the young Salafist radicals that better represent the emergence of 
Salafism in Tunisia and it is this cohort that is one of the most significant political and 
social protagonists of the Tunisian transition. Broadly speaking, it largely rejects 
institutional politics because it does not believe that politics within plural institutions can 
deliver the material and, more significantly, ethical goods they crave. The sociological 
composition of these Salafist radicals is that of the mouhammishin – the disenfranchised – 
of Tunisian society. This term is quite useful to understand the phenomenon of this 
radicalism in so far as it is used in a derogatory sense in those political and social circles 
that are participating to the construction of new institutions in the context of a 
democratization process that seems to be unable to deal with the socio-economic 
fractures that ultimately favors the rise of radical Salafism. The sense that the liberal-
democratic order being built in Tunisia is the work of two different social blocs – a 
conservative religious bourgeoisie and a nationalist modernizing one - which excludes a 
priori the more radical political demands of the poorer classes of society permeates the 
activism of the Salafists. The usefulness of the terminology of the muhammishin is also 
that they were the protagonists of the revolutionary uprising and met the violence of the 
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security forces with violence of their own reinforcing through their actions the 
revolutionary drive of the rest of society, as indicated in Amin Allal’s work as well.13 
These young men, as they are overwhelmingly men, are generally poorly educated, come 
from lower classes and they have very rarely opportunities to enter the job market 
because they lack the necessary skills to compete. In fact, they represent the dark side of 
the development model that Ben Ali offered. They are the ones who attempted to leave 
the country in order to reach the northern bank of the Mediterranean illegally – 
incidentally it is something that continues to this day – and often displayed a considerable 
degree of social violence in very specific and confined contexts such as football 
stadiums.14 This cohort has been left out not only from the material benefits of the 
‘Tunisian economic miracle’, but also from the cultural and social practices associated to 
the modernizing efforts and reforms of the previous regimes whereby any regime-led 
discussion of modernity and secularism was not even contemplated and reflected upon. 
It simply did not reach this sector of society in any meaningful way. On the contrary, 
their values of references as well as the symbols they use is rife with forms of simplistic 
religious  representation, which is an edgier re-elaboration of what they are daily exposed 
to in their family environment and in their immediate neighborhood, the real extent of 
their socialization outside the home. When the dictatorship falls and new spaces of post-
revolutionary identification are permitted to exist out in the open in a rapid liberalizing 
and pluralizing society, many of them quite spontaneously embrace the more radical 
form of Salafism with jihadi inclinations because this allows them to express their 
radicalism through the permissible language of religion. This type of salafism, which, 
once again, needs not to embrace armed violence because it can be also practiced as 
militant individual engagement to be a better Muslim and strive to convince others of the 
‘right path’, also provides a political dimension that allows the mouhammishin to question 
the way in which the new Tunisian political authority is being constructed because, just as 
the previous one, it marginalizes them and becomes therefore unjust. In addition to this, 
the return to the perceived purity of the original religious message and practice of Islam 
offers two significant instruments. First, it allows them to find points of reference that 
explain their marginal socio-economic condition and a map to get out of it in a world 
they cannot otherwise make sense of due to the clash between Western modernity and 
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tradition they find themselves trapped in their own society. Second, it provides them 
with a tool to criticize their elders who are accused of subscribing to a religiosity that is 
both repetitive and unfulfilling and therefore unable to capture and understand the 
universal significance of Islam and of the prophet’s mission. After all their ‘fathers’ had 
willingly or unwillingly accepted the corrupt, authoritarian and impious government of 
Ben Ali while they succeeded in overthrowing it. The absence of appeal for the message 
of Jebah al-Islah can be thus linked to this generational fracture and suggests that there are 
other political actors within salafism more capable of conveying the instances of the 
mouhammishin. Leading Salafists have no qualms admitting that they belong to and they 
seek the support of this social category of disenfranchised; in fact they find pride in it. 
Whereas other political forces including Ennahda and sectors of scientific Salafism use 
the representation of such a social category to discredit them, the jihadi Salafists consider 
this class as the vehicle for a process of genuine indigenous Islamic re-generation in 
Tunisia and the point of departure of their mission of dawa. The dawa officer of the 
Salafist movement Ansar a-Sharia, Hassan Briek, now in jail for his perceived role in the 
attack on the US embassy of October 2012, reveals with pride in an interview with the 
authors held on September 22 2012 in Yasminette, that many of the young people now 
active in the movement were recruited in jail during the Ben Ali era when they were 
serving sentences for non-political crimes. This highlights the connection between the 
marginalized youth falling into a life of crime and their subsequent ‘conversion’ to 
Salafism through dawa in prison. This is a point of pride for the movement rather than 
shame because it demonstrates the power of the religious message in redeeming lives. In 
addition, the same Hassan Briek talks about the large following that the movement has in 
difficult – read poorer – areas and neighborhoods such as Ettadhamen, al-Omrana al-ala, 
al-Khadra and Ibn Khaldoun in Tunis, Menzel Bourhiba and Sejenene in the province of 
Bizerte and Sidi Bouzid. Briek is happy to claim the success of the process of 
politicization of a social class that encountered and still encounters considerable 
discrimination and contempt from the rest of society. The politicization of the 
mouhammishin into Salafism exposes some of the difficulties of a transition to democracy 
that seems to concern only higher social classes, busy finding an institutional democratic 
compromise that is not perceived to be able to radically change social relations in Tunisia 
because it is fundamentally a bourgeois pact. Largely confirming the fracture and absence 
of communication within Tunisian society is the fact that while the Constitutional 
Assembly keeps working on the new text and the traditional politicians are busy arguing, 
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very few notice the growth of the Salafist phenomenon and even fewer analyze it and 
understand it, limiting themselves to condemn the most visible and violent 
demonstrations of its presence. The relevant role of the concept of class might seem 
outdated, but it is helpful in framing the way in which political struggles occur in the 
Arab world more generally,15 but in Tunisia in particular because it allows a better 
understanding both the phenomenon of Salafism itself and the fear it instills in the other 
sectors of society.   
   The identification of the social class that radical Salafism largely draws from 
should not however lead to the assumption that there is a unified structured movement 
that is capable of monopolizing its representation. Thus, a movement like Ansar a-Sharia, 
despite its importance and its undoubted primacy, should not be conflated with the 
whole spectrum of radical jihadi Salafism, which can be better defined as a mouvance or 
tendency with unitary ideological pillars, religious and social references and political goals 
without yet a unified organisational structure that can speak for the whole camp.   
 
A mouvance in search of a movement? 
 The overwhelming focus of Tunisian politicians, the media and the international 
community on Salafists involved in violent demonstrations or in disruptive behavior 
usually leads to calls from the secular sector of society and many within Ennahda for a 
crackdown on Salafist activism, but this presupposes that there is a tightly organized 
structured movement within Salafism that can be easily targeted with repression.  This 
however is not yet the case and this focus on the violence that Salafists at times display 
on the public scene should not obscure the fact that there is a daily practice of Salafism 
where there is no violence and, in addition, where differences over the direction of the 
mouvance forcefully emerge, suggesting that when it comes to episodes of violence there 
might not be a planned Salafist machination behind it, as they could simply be quite 
spontaneous, if condemnable, events.  
 The daily practices and social activism of Salafism can be seen at work in the 
areas and neighborhoods mentioned earlier as a form of socialization that involves a 
youth that does not feel represented by the political system. It is in these very specific 
contexts, and following the radicalization that both precedes and follows the revolution, 
that we see the emergence of a phenomenon that can be defined as ‘sheikh-ism.’ This is 
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the arrival on the scene of a number of young sheikhs. They found Salafism in two 
different manners. First, it occurred in Ben Ali’s prisons during the period 2005-2011 
when they radicalized politically. Second, they became Salafist in the immediate aftermath 
of the revolution through a very rapid process of politicization forged in the clashes with 
the security forces and legitimized by the participation of the mouhammishin for the first 
time as social subjects in the success of the uprising. These young sheikhs become the 
transmission belts of knowledge and activism between the better known older Salafist 
sheikhs, who excel in the religious sciences or have acquired legitimacy because of their 
personal participation in international jihadi activities such as the war in Iraq, and the 
ordinary activists in their neighborhood of reference over which they exercise a degree of 
influence. What we have is not though an organized network that is structured around a 
formalized hierarchy, yet, but a looser type of an ever extending network based on 
personal informal contacts that is favored by the ‘preaching tours’ that the better known 
sheikhs undertake throughout the country to lecture at different mosques. Some of these 
sheikhs do not simply lecture, but also offer longer courses on a specific topic or author 
and award students a form of accreditation of knowledge on religious matters. These 
lecturing tours go hand in hand with the creation of religious schools across the country. 
Non-governmental associations set up these schools and are in some ways the 
continuation of a phenomenon that had appeared in the late Ben Ali period when a 
number of Quranic schools were opened in order to promote the correct reading of the 
Quran with the proviso that they refrain from engaging in political issues.16  
All these activities contribute almost inevitably to a process of structuration of 
the Salafist mouvance, but at the same time expose the significant differences that exist 
within it regarding the desirability and the extent of such structuration. Thus, with the 
expansion of the education dawa through the lectures and speaking tours and the sharing 
of symbolism and ideological convergence, there is the spontaneous emergence of three 
loose hierarchical levels: the famous religiously knowledgeable sheikhs who are the 
theoretical and ideological points of reference; the neighborhood sheikhs that function as 
the intermediaries connecting the leaders of the mouvance to the popular base and then 
what can be described tentatively as ordinary activists who remain the more volatile part 
of the mouvance and do not necessarily follow in any meaningful way the directives and 
instructions coming from above precisely because a traditional organizational structure 
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with its rules and procedures is still non-existent. The most significant issues for the 
Salafist mouvance are how to deal with this embryonic structure that is still loose and 
whether it is desirable to strengthen it. It is at this juncture that the complexity of 
Tunisian Salafism is demonstrated because we have the emergence of three camps that 
while agreeing on the fundamental ideological points of creating an Islamic state ruled by 
a fundamentalist interpretation of sharia law that would purge Tunisia of its Western-
style modernity, are divided over the best way to achieve this goal. In addition, the 
mouvance and its ideological leaders in particular have to contend with two important 
aspects that affect their thinking. First there is the realization that the Salafist movement 
is growing quite rapidly and to a large extent independently from clear organizational 
structures, as more and more young individuals make the choice of personal religious 
rediscovery according to Salafist canons. Second, there is also the ‘fear’ that too many 
un-controlled acts of violence on the part of what the rest of society sees as Salafist 
youth is damaging the image of Salafism as whole, equating it with violence and inviting 
repression. All of this leads to the opening up of an intense debate over structure and 
organization. To begin with there are two rather clear camps: the one favorable to the 
creation of clear and formal structures and the one resolutely opposed to it for both 
ideological and strategic reasons. A third camp might also slowly be emerging that is 
attempting to reconcile the two positions. The first camp is well represented by Abu 
Ayadh, the architect and recognized leader of Ansar a-Sharia. The movement was 
founded officially in May 2012 although it had been operating already for almost year by 
then. The opposite camp finds in the works and activities of sheik Khatib Idrissi its point 
of reference. Idrissi is considered the spiritual father of modern radical Tunisian Salafism. 
The third emerging camp can be seen in the attitude to the debate of Abu Abdallah 
Attunsi, another important and respected sheikh who seems to represent the middle-
ground between those who are in favor and those who are opposed to the organizational 
model that Ansar a-Sharia offers. When asked about his personal position on this debate 
in an interview on October 8, 2012 in Sidi Bouzid with the authors on he replied that he 
preferred to remain in the middle and operate for a synthesis of the two options.   
The intensity of the debate over the creation of formal political structures is 
explained by the fact that the principle of creating an organization is intrinsically in 
conflict with the ‘spirit’ of Salafism. For instance, scientific Salafists abhor all references 
and connotations that can lead one to identify the activism of Salafists with specific 
organizations. This is because it is in contradiction with the absolute principle of tawhid, 
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which is the theoretical foundation of Salafist thinking. The subscription to this principle 
of unity is shared across all Salafist currents and is the ideological foundation for Salafist 
orthodoxy. In many ways it crucially opposes the principle of hizbiyya, which the term 
hizb as political party is derived from, because it is linked to the concept of juz’ia – 
partiality – considered to be the first step towards the problematic divisions within the 
community of believers and therefore the ultimate negation of the principle of unity. It is 
a form of shirk (associationism). All this would indicate that structuring Salafism in order 
for it to take part in a process where these divisions within the umma are institutionalized 
should not occur because genuine Salafists should simply work within society to make 
these divisions disappear, justifying therefore the rejectionist approach of the second 
camp. However in very specific cases, as Abu Kattada makes it clear in the official organ 
of Ansar a- Sharia al-Wa’ad,17 when for historical contingencies the umma finds itself in a 
position of weakness because under threat for instance from secular modernity or 
impious imperialism, the necessity to save it allows for the organization of a cohesive and 
formal group that is charged with leading the umma to ‘safety.’ This notion of the 
vanguard, which is an implicit reference to the work of Sayyid Qutb, therefore appears to 
justify the position of those like Abu Ayadh who emphasizes the present necessity for a 
formal organization. The Tunisian Salafist movement and Salafism more generally as 
well, therefore displays a rather profound fracture between those who are influenced by 
Qutb’s thinking and by implication that of the Muslim Brothers – keen on political 
participation through formally organized groups - and those who can be labeled as 
‘fundamentally Salafists’ anchored to the hyper-orthodox concept of tawhid. In practice 
this debate is translated in everyday activities with tentative steps towards a form of 
organizational institutionalization such as the one that Ansar a- Sharia represents and a 
pulling-back effect on the part of those who, while sharing Ansar a- Sharia’s objectives 
and ideological commitment, are still not convinced that a jamaa is yet necessary. For 
instance there are many young people who utilize the symbols of Ansar a- Sharia and 
share the political project of the group, but, at the same time, come close to negating its 
very existence because the local sheikhs of reference do not share the theoretical 
approach of Abu Ayadh and are therefore reluctant to be seen condoning the creation of 
a formal structure. As the young Salafist B. in an interview with the authors on 
September 25, 2012 in Tunis affirms ‘we are all brothers, and every single one of us is 
responsible for himself’ suggesting that there is no need to belong to any organization in 
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order to be the ‘good Muslim’ that society requires you to be. More importantly it is not 
necessary to be a card-carrying member of a Salafist group because it is your personal 
example that is transformative of society.  This partly explains the reason why it is so 
difficult to give Salafism a recognizable and recognized face that represents the whole 
movement.  
The ‘US embassy crisis’ of September 2012 highlights well the problems arising 
from any attempt to clearly identify and categorize Tunisian Salafism. Faced with the 
extremely worrying and negative consequences of the attack on the US embassy, the 
ruling coalition, under pressure both domestically and internationally to crack down on 
Salafism, targeted the leadership of Ansar a- Sharia. This led to arrest and imprisonment 
of many of its leading members, but not Abu Ayadh who became a fugitive. The 
repression of Ansar a- Sharia however brings to light the complexity of Salafism discussed 
above because the crackdown does not stop the growth of the mouvance in so far as it is 
unable to come to terms with the fact that Ansar a- Sharia does not represent the entire 
spectrum of Salafism. There are three different ways in which this complexity emerges 
on the public scene. First, we have the criticism of Ansar a- Sharia and Abu Ayadh 
coming from within the mouvance itself , specifically from that sector that never agreed 
with his choice of formal structuration precisely because it would invite, rather 
needlessly, repression rendering therefore the educational dawa potentially more difficult. 
Second, members of Ansar a- Sharia such as Hassan Briek questioned the validity of the 
crackdown in its political and strategic premises. For him, implicitly, targeting Ansar a- 
Sharia for repression is a mistake because he sees the movement as a positive 
development in so far as it strives to give a ‘proper’ formal coordination and 
structuration to what is a popular Salafism in a state of flux, avoiding therefore its fusion 
in society as an anti-systemic force difficult to pin down. For Briek, Ansar a- Sharia is 
actually rendering a service to the ongoing process of institutionalization. Third, the lack 
of efficacy of the repressive campaign against Ansar a- Sharia in halting Salafist activism 
made the ruling coalition realize that the true nature of it is found in the mouvance and not 
in a movement. Thus, the state authorities attempted to reach the sector of un-structured 
Salafism through a dialogue with the leading figure in the second camp, sheikh Khatib 
Idrissi. On October 11 2012 the President of the Republic met officially with five 
representatives of the salafist mouvance (Khamis al-Majri, Mohammad Manif, Abu Sahib, 
Abu Abdallah a-Tunisi e Mohammed abu Bakr), three of which were nominated by a 
council of sheikhs headed by Idrissi himself. Thus, paradoxically, the ones who were 
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against the creation of organsaitional structures that could institutionalise Salafism found 
themselves having to create a structure, in this case the council of sheikhs, in order to 
‘negotiate’ with representatives of the state to de-limit the space of activism and the 
boundaries of the permissable on the public scene. This indicates that even in the second 
camp the necessity of having at the very least a coordinating instance  - tansiq - is present. 
It is this realization that favors the emergence of the third camp, attempting to reconcile 
two approaches that are theoretically in conflict, but that have to find some sort of 
compromise because of the liberal and democratic reality within which Salafism itself is 
operating. This reality requires a degree of institutionalized representation for negotiating 
purposes.  
 
Elements for reflection 
 This examination of the emergence and complexity of Tunisian Salafism outside 
the alarmist framework through which the phenomenon is often presented and discussed 
in public debates both inside and outside the country offers the possibility to link it to 
wider theoretical issues that are of importance for the understanding of processes of 
regime change.  
 First, any analysis of Salafism in Tunisia cannot exclude the class element that 
characterizes it. While the category of social class of Marxist inspiration might not be any 
longer appropriate to understand political phenomena in established democracies and 
advanced states, this is not necessarily the case in developing societies going through 
profound economic and political changes. Salafism in Tunisia is linked to the political 
and social expression of a class of largely disenfranchised youth that perceives, rightly or 
wrongly, the construction of a new political system as the renovation of a mechanism 
that, while no longer authoritarian, still excludes them from the enjoyment of material 
and ethical benefits they feel entitled to for having played a crucial role in the defeat of 
the Ben Ali regime. A very significant part of Tunisian society did not participate in the 
historic 2011 elections because it did not see how a new political system would change 
their everyday conditions and a sector of this ‘non-participative’ society identifies the 
current political and social blocs in the Constitutional Assembly with a political 
conservativism destined to replicate the existing class structures and preventing the 
coming of a genuine Islamic state where these would disappear. The problem is not 
necessarily about the redistribution of material goods, although this plays a role, but is 
more intensely about ethical demands that Salafists see anchored in religion and, more 
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specifically, in the mythical application of sharia law that by itself would solve all 
problems. The refusal in particular of Ennahda to subscribe to the application of sharia 
in a fundamentalist manner is perceived to be a sleight to Islam itself and therefore 
Salafists are unwilling to become involved in the construction of a political system that 
leads to an unjust society. The marginalization of this social class from the wider process 
of transition to democracy recalls an older debate about the way in which a democratic 
system can be built when it has to accommodate the socio-economic demands coming 
from the disenfranchised sectors of society.18 In order to build a liberal-democratic 
system these demands should be postponed with the preference for the establishment of 
clear procedural rules to govern the country. While this might indeed generate better 
functioning institutions, it impedes the allegiance to the new system of vast sectors of the 
population as their demands, so they are told, are going to be dealt only at a later stage 
when the new institutions have proven their strength and durability. This strategy carries 
risks in the longer term because meeting the socio-economic demands of the 
disenfranchised might not occur in the future, leading to profound imbalances. Tunisia is 
not there yet, but the confrontation with the Salafist mouvance might be an indication of 
how different social blocs interpret and more importantly live in their everyday practices 
the success of the revolution. What is important to highlight is that not all the 
disenfranchised find in Salafism the answers they are looking for. On the one hand, there 
are small socialist/communist formations that attempt to mobilize it, although with little 
success. On the other, there is a degree of apathy towards anything that is even remotely 
linked to politics.  
 Second, the Salafist mouvance finds itself in a predicament with respect to the 
wider environment in which it operates. All salafists are clearly opposed to any form of 
democracy that is outside the bounds of sharia law. In this sense they approve of 
democratic mechanisms of representation as long as the legislative outcomes are not in 
contradiction with sharia. This is however not the case at the moment, in so far as both 
the draft Constitution and ordinary legislation do not codify sharia in any meaningful way 
and, in addition, it is possible for decisions that go against sharia to be adopted as public 
policy. All this is exemplified in the answer that Briek gave to the question of how Ansar 
a – Sharia thinks about democracy: 
‘we do not believe in democracy, although this does not mean that we are against 
the idea of elections or consultations to elect the representatives of the 
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community. The point is that until we live in a society where there are secular 
people or there are those who do not apply sharia law, we cannot conceive of the 
fact that in the name of majority rule a contravention of divine norms could be 
permissible. Within the framework of sharia law there is no reason why the 
community could not choose [through elections] its own representatives.’ 
However, there is a clear realization that the free plural environment that they 
theoretically reject allows them to operate with little restraint either institutionally, if they 
choose that option, or in wider society through educational dawa. Despite the different 
ideological and theoretical approaches to organizational matters that divide the mouvance, 
all agree that at the moment the situation is rather favorable in so far as the degree of 
autonomy they enjoy is sufficiently strong to allow them to grow. It also means that in 
order to be able to continue to do so in a relatively repression-free environment they 
have to come two factors. On the one hand, the recourse to armed violence to impose 
their vision of society has to be out of the question because this would simply invite a 
conflict with the authorities and the other sectors of society that would ultimately 
undermine their ability to further penetrate society. This realist attitude with respect to 
the surrounding environment has led a prominent Salafist figure such as Abu Ayadh to 
repeat over and over that ‘Tunisia is dawa-land’ and not an arena of open conflict 
between belief and unbelief that would justify resorting to violence. This message is 
shared in internal debates among the different strands of salafism, including the sheikhs 
who publicly endorse Tunisia as dawa-land. On the other, there is the recognition that 
some form of coordination or structure is needed to negotiate spaces of activism with 
the state as outlined earlier. 
 Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the rise of Salafism is progressively 
and paradoxically empowering those sectors of society militantly opposed to it. While 
under Ben Ali there was a sort of delegation of the battle against radical Islamism to the 
security services on the part of liberals and seculars, in the new Tunisia, where this is no 
longer possible, this sector of society has to find the strength and mobilizational capacity 
within itself to stand the challenge of what they refer to as obscurantisme.19 The appearance 
of such strong conflicts over radically diverging views of society in public can be in some 
ways cathartic for the country as whole because it is forced to be confronted with 
political projects that while antithetical still find a degree of common ground in the 
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nominal subscription to the recognition of the pluralism present in Tunisian society. In 
this context it is up to the political system and the elected representatives to build 
institutions that are capable and sufficiently strong to manage such social conflict and 
find the balance for the creation of a ‘pact of co-existence.’ 
 
Conclusion 
 This article does not question the importance of examining the institutional and 
political games that take place at state level with their emphasis on the workings of the 
Constitutional assembly, the political parties and the reform process of the institutions of 
the state. However it is also important to analyze what occurs ‘below the radar’ in wider 
society without falling into the dual traps of surprise and alarmism. The Salafist 
phenomenon in Tunisia is a relevant aspect of the changes that have taken place in the 
country over the longue durée and a closer look at its complexity is necessary to highlight 
both the constraints and opportunities that weigh on the whole process of transition. 
 Salafism in Tunisia is in a state of flux, rife with internal contradictions and 
characterized by intense debates over the direction it should take in the future, but it also 
provides an opportunity for Tunisian society to engage in a rhetorical confrontation with 
a mouvance that both rejects and benefits from the plural political and social system it 
operates in.   
 
 
